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Abstract 
 
According to temporal self-appraisal theory, people evaluate themselves in the past in a way that 
makes them feel good about themselves in the present. In line with this theory, studies have 
shown that people believe their personality has changed more in the past than it will change in 
the future. This thesis investigated whether episodic memory plays a role in one's temporal self-
appraisal. A person with developmental amnesia and episodic memory impairment (H.C.) was 
compared with groups of age-matched controls on tasks assessing their personality traits and 
social competence in the present, the past, and the future. H.C. and controls reported that their 
personality has changed more in the past five years than it will change in the next five years and 
rated their present selves as more socially competent than their past selves. The findings suggest 
that temporal self-appraisal does not require one to revisit experiences in episodic memory. 
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 1 
Temporal Self-Appraisal in Developmental Amnesia 
  People tend to affirm their present self-regard by adjusting their view of themselves in 
the past (Wilson & Ross, 2003). According to temporal self-appraisal theory, they do so by 
evaluating themselves less favourably in the past, thereby inflating their self-worth in the 
present. In line with this theory, studies have shown that people erroneously tend to believe that 
their personality has changed more in a certain amount of time from the past to the present than it 
will change in the same amount time from the present to the future (Quoidbach, Gilbert, & 
Wilson, 2013). It has been suggested that both ends of this temporally based, self-serving bias 
may be influenced by one’s autobiographical memories (i.e., memories related to personal facts 
and experiences; Quoidbach et al., 2013; Wilson & Ross, 2003). However, the relative 
contributions of episodic (i.e., the ability to mentally re-experience past events) and semantic 
(i.e., factual knowledge) components of autobiographical memory (Tulving, 1972) to temporal 
self-appraisal have not been formally tested. Specifically, it is unclear whether retrieval of past 
personal experiences that are specific to a time and place in episodic memory and/or personal 
semantic knowledge is necessary or sufficient to make reasonably consistent time-based 
judgments of the self. The current study investigates the contributions of episodic and semantic 
memory to temporal self-appraisal by testing H.C., an individual with developmental amnesia, 
on a series of temporal self-appraisal tasks. Individuals with developmental amnesia have 
profound lifelong impairment in episodic memory and relatively intact semantic memory. The 
findings may suggest a possible mechanism of the self-serving biases in temporal self-appraisal. 
If episodic memory is needed for temporal self-appraisal, H.C. should not show the same bias in 
temporal self-appraisal as healthy controls. However, if temporal self-appraisal can rely only on 
semantic memory, then H.C. should show the self-serving biases observed in controls. 
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Temporal Self-Appraisal 
Temporal self-appraisal theory posits a bidirectional relationship between one’s current 
self-identity and autobiographical memory (Wilson & Ross, 2003). Indeed, the way we appraise 
ourselves in the present influences the kind of memories we retrieve from the past (Wilson & 
Ross, 2003). For example, to inflate one's self-worth in the present, one would bring to mind 
more negative past memories to appraise one’s present self as relatively superior to the past self. 
Conversely, memories of the past may influence our self-identity in the present (Wilson & Ross, 
2003). For example, manipulation of one’s subjective temporal distance (i.e., how close 
individuals feel to their past selves) leads to negative self-appraisals in the present if one’s 
present self is perceived to be relatively close to a negative past experience. It follows that 
increasing the subjective temporal distance from past negative experiences leads to more positive 
self-appraisals in the present. According to temporal self-appraisal theory, subjective judgments 
of temporal distance, and not the objective distance (i.e., how long ago the event actually 
occurred), play an important role in one’s self-appraisal in the present (Wilson & Ross, 2003). 
Findings supporting the temporal self-appraisal theory have been attributed to the malleability of 
memory, suggesting that we “reconstruct” the memory of our past selves in ways that make us 
feel good about ourselves in the present (Cameron, Wilson, & Ross, 2004). It has also been 
proposed that such memory biases could be creating an illusion of change (Conway & Ross, 
1984). Although in this explanation of the memory bias, the researchers have not formally 
distinguished between different types of memory, the idea of reconstruction of the memory of 
our past selves suggests that the reference was likely to episodic memory.  
Another related self-serving bias in self-appraisal is the end of history illusion (i.e., the 
belief that we have changed more in the past than we will change in the future; Quoidbach et al., 
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2013). In that study, participants were randomly assigned to either reporter (i.e., describing 
themselves 10 years ago) or predictor (i.e., describing their predicted self 10 years from now) 
conditions. Both groups also provided their personality ratings in the present with the Ten Item 
Personality Inventory (Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swan, 2003). In a sample of 7519 adults, ranging in 
age from 18 to 68 years old, participants consistently reported a greater change in personality 
from past to present than they predicted to change from present to future (Quoidbach et al., 
2013). As suggested by Quodibach et al., it is possible that the bias is associated with the 
difficulty of imagining future selves relative to remembering past selves. It is possible that when 
individuals have difficulty imagining themselves in the future it may erroneously lead them to 
believe that changes are unlikely. Case H.C. is a well-studied case of developmental amnesia, 
whose impairment in future imagining abilities is under debate (Hurley, Maguire, & Vargha-
Khadem, 2011; Kwan et al., 2010). However, even if H.C.’s future imagining is 
indistinguishable from controls, it is superior to her episodic memory, a pattern that is unlike that 
of controls. If the end of history illusion depends on the relative difficulty of future imagining to 
episodic memory, we would not expect to observe this bias in H.C.   
Autobiographical Memory and the Self 
In memory research, there is a general distinction between episodic memory and 
semantic memory. When it comes to autobiographical memories, semantic autobiographical 
memory has been defined as a memory for personal facts (e.g., I live in Toronto; Levine, 
Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, & Moscovitch, 2002). However, the distinction between episodic and 
semantic autobiographical memories is not always clear (Renoult, Davidson, Palombo, 
Moscovitch, & Levine, 2016). Recently, it was found that individuals with lesions to the medial 
temporal lobes (MTL) who have deficits in retrieving episodic memories also show deficits in 
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retrieving experience-near autobiographical facts that incorporate some spatiotemporal details 
about the events (e.g., my first child was born during a blizzard) relative to controls (Grilli & 
Verfaellie, 2016). In the same study, it was found that generation of experience-far 
autobiographical facts that do not contain spatiotemporal details (e.g., I have four siblings) was 
intact in patients whose lesions were restricted to the MTL. The findings of a recent ERP study 
suggest that the temporal component of self-knowledge (i.e., thinking of one’s own 
characteristics in the past and in the future) may rely to some extent on one’s capacity for mental 
time travel (Tanguay et al., 2018). Furthermore, the ERP results suggest that self-knowledge in 
the present (e.g., thinking to what extent a certain trait describes you in the present) shares more 
similarities with past and future self-knowledge (e.g., thinking to what extent a certain trait 
described you in the past or may describe you in the future) than with semantic knowledge (e.g., 
thinking to what extent a certain trait describes people of a certain occupation; Tanguay et al., 
2018). The difference between self-knowledge and general semantic knowledge has also been 
noted in research focusing on the role of the self-reference effect in enhancing episodic memory 
in younger (Symons & Johnson, 1997) and older adults (Carson, Murphy, Moscovitch, & 
Rosenbaum, 2016).  
One proposed framework for the study of the sense of self and autobiographical memory 
delineates sense of self along two dimensions: content of self (i.e., me-self) versus subjective 
sense of self (i.e., experience of selfhood), and present self versus temporally extended self 
(Prebble, Addis, & Tippett, 2013). According to the proposed model, temporal aspects of the 
content of self (e.g., rating one's traits during different lifetime periods) are supported by 
semanticized autobiographical memories that are essential for semantic continuity (Prebble et al., 
2013). 
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In the Self Memory System (SMS) model of autobiographical memory, knowledge about 
the self is distinguished from the episodic memory system (Conway, Singer, & Tagini, 2004). 
However, the theory also posits a bidirectional relationship between the episodic memory system 
and one’s knowledge of self, and that in order to maintain a stable and coherent view of the self, 
one relies on the episodic memory system (Conway et al., 2004). The model also suggests that 
retrieval of autobiographical memories relies on one's ability to integrate the knowledge of the 
self with episodic memories (Conway et al., 2004). The abundance of literature in different areas 
of psychology linking the self with episodic memory suggests that perhaps episodic memory 
plays an important role in one’s self-appraisal. However, studies conducted in different groups of 
patients with brain lesions show mixed evidence regarding the role of episodic memory in one’s 
self-knowledge. 
Self-knowledge in Individuals with Memory Impairment 
The idea that our memories make us who we are has inspired research into how 
individuals with memory impairments due to brain lesions or cognitive decline perceive 
themselves and their experiences over time. These findings also shed light on how self-
knowledge is acquired and maintained in a neurotypical brain. After the onset of the disease, 
individuals with Alzheimer’s (AD) undergo a substantial change in personality. For example, a 
person diagnosed with AD, K.R., was able to describe her premorbid personality but had 
difficulty updating her self-knowledge after disease onset (Klein, Cosmides, & Costabile, 2003). 
K.R. provided ratings of herself on a list of personality traits (e.g., “Does this word describe you: 
Stubborn? Yes or No”; Klein et al., 2003). Whereas the ratings were not significantly correlated 
with K.R.’s daughter’s ratings of her mother in the present, K.R.’s ratings correlated significantly 
with her daughter’s description of K.R.’s premorbid personality. A study of a group of 20 
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patients showed that individuals with AD tended to have a weaker, less concrete, and more 
negative sense of identity relative to controls (Addis & Tippett, 2004). Furthermore, significant 
correlations have been found between autobiographical memories (semantic and episodic) from 
childhood and early adulthood and the strength and quality of one’s identity (Addis & Tippett, 
2004). The findings from studies in AD patients suggest that perhaps certain aspects of self-
knowledge (e.g., updating) are dependent on both episodic and semantic memory systems 
working together, which supports the idea put forward by the SMS model.    
Other studies of self-knowledge in patients with memory impairments show that 
information about self is preserved even in individuals with profound deficits in episodic 
memory. Amnesic patients K.C. (Tulving, 1993) and D.B. (Klein, Rozendal, & Cosmides, 2002) 
were able to provide reasonably accurate ratings of their own personality traits. The patients’ 
self-ratings on the lists of traits were strongly correlated with the ratings of the patients provided 
by their family members. These correlations were not significantly different from the 
correlations of self-ratings between the control group and their family members (Klein, 
Rozendal, et al., 2002; Tulving, 1993). Whereas individuals with deficits in both episodic and 
semantic memories (i.e., AD patients) have a weaker and more negative self-identity and are not 
able to update their self-knowledge, individuals whose deficits are restricted to episodic memory 
(i.e., individuals with hippocampal amnesia) are able to update their self-knowledge and provide 
relatively accurate self-ratings. However, even patients with impaired episodic memory but 
seemingly intact semantic memory show deficits in certain aspects of self-concept. A recent 
study of individuals with hippocampal amnesia investigated the extent to which the self-concept 
is supported by autobiographical memory (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015). Eight amnesic patients and 
12 controls completed eight “I am___” statements. Participants were asked to support their top 
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four statements with a narrative describing why they chose to describe themselves using those 
words (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015). It was found that both groups mostly relied on their semantic 
memory to provide the self-supporting information, but amnesic patients generated fewer of the 
semantic memories than controls. The study also found that amnesic patients were less likely to 
include traits in their top four ‘I am’ statements, which could be due to their deficit in generating 
the trait-supporting semantic memories (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2015). The findings suggest the need 
to look beyond the self-ratings of personality in the present and investigate more detailed aspects 
of self-concept.   
Self-knowledge was also tested in two patients with developmental amnesia (Picard et al., 
2013). Whereas in adult-onset amnesia, patients could have developed a self-concept by relying 
on their pre-morbid episodic and semantic memories, individuals with developmental amnesia 
never develop typical episodic memory and acquired semantic memory in its relative absence. It 
was found that individuals with developmental amnesia were able to develop a multidimensional 
and coherent self-concept that was generally not significantly different from controls’ (Picard et 
al., 2013). In the same study, it was also found that individuals with developmental amnesia 
tended to have a slightly more positive self-concept than neurotypical controls. Given a life-long 
deficit in episodic memory in this population, the ability to reflect on one’s own personality in 
the past and the change in their personality over time need to be explored in order to better 
understand the role of episodic memory in one’s self-knowledge. It has been argued that 
conceptual self-knowledge does not only involve the evaluation of self in the present but also 
involves evaluations of self in the past and the future (Markus & Nurius, 1986). On the other 
hand, studies in healthy individuals showed that present and past self-knowledge are associated 
with different patterns of brain activity (D’Argembeau et al., 2008). Therefore, it is unclear 
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whether individuals with developmental amnesia retain their temporal self-appraisal abilities in 
addition to their intact self-knowledge in the present.  
If both past and future self-knowledge rely only on semantic memory, it is possible that, 
similar to other semantic knowledge (Gardiner, Brandt, Baddeley, Vargha-Khadem, & Mishkin, 
2008), the actual personality change in individuals with developmental amnesia takes longer to 
update than in healthy controls. Alternatively, the self-concept may also be less stable because of 
the potential difficulty in accessing trait-supporting semantic knowledge.  
Since the temporal self-appraisal theory highlights the role of one’s subjective judgment 
of temporal distance in their self-appraisal, it is important to consider the performance of 
individuals with MTL on tasks involving temporal judgments and time perception. Hippocampal 
sensitivity to time perception has been well-established in the literature (Barnett, O’Neil, 
Watson, & Lee, 2014; Kraus, Robinson, White, Eichenbaum, & Hasselmo, 2012; MacDonald, 
Lepage, Eden, & Eichenbaum, 2011; Nichelli, Venneri, Molinari, Tavani, & Grafman, 1993). 
Individuals with MTL lesions showed impairments in estimating the duration of long (more than 
4 min), but not short (less than 90 s) stimuli (Palombo, Keane, Verfaellie, 2016).    
Imagining a Future Self 
 The ability to predict how one might change in the future may rely on one’s ability to 
imagine the future. There are substantial similarities between retrieving past episodic memories 
and imagining potential future events that have not yet occurred as indicated by patient studies 
showing impaired episodic memory and future imagining in individuals with adult-onset amnesia 
(Andelman, Hoofien, Goldberg, Aizenstein, & Neufeld, 2010; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & 
Maguire, 2007; Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 2002; Race, Keane, & Verfaellie, 2011) and 
neuroimaging studies showing that the two abilities activate a common network of brain regions 
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(Addis & Schacter, 2008; Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007; Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Kirwan, 
Ashby, & Nash, 2014; Spreng, Stevens, Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010). Nevertheless, 
there are also key differences between the two processes. Past research suggests that imagining 
the future is more effortful and requires more cognitive resources than remembering the past 
(Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007). One possible explanation for the end of history illusion 
proposed by Quodibach et al. (2013) is that because imagining yourself in the future is a more 
effortful task than remembering yourself in the past, people think that they are not likely to 
change in the future. In individuals with developmental amnesia, the findings are mixed with 
regard to their ability to imagine the future (cf. Cooper, Vargha-Khadem, Gadian, & Maguire, 
2011; Hurley et al., 2011; Kwan et al., 2010). Whereas one study found that amnesic case H.C. 
showed deficits in imagining future events (Kwan et al., 2010), a separate study showed that she 
was able to generate future scenarios (Hurley et al., 2011). The difference in the findings could 
be attributed to a practice effect in that, over repeated test sessions involving narrative 
construction tasks, H.C. had adjusted her strategy to maximize the number of generated details 
(Rabin, Carson, Gilboa, Stuss, & Rosenbaum, 2013). Even if individuals with developmental 
amnesia are able to imagine themselves in the future but are impaired in remembering 
themselves in the past, they would be expected to show the opposite of the end of history illusion 
(i.e., predicting to change more from present to future than reporting to have changed from past 
to present).   
 The purpose of the current research was to investigate the role of the episodic memory in 
supporting past, present, and future self-knowledge. This research also investigated whether the 
self-serving biases that allow us to see ourselves favourably in the present are preserved in 
individuals with developmental amnesia despite compromised episodic memory. Although 
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previous research shows that individuals with developmental and acquired amnesia are able to 
develop and update their personality, research to date has not assessed biases in past- and future-
oriented view of the self that are typical of adults across lifespan. In order to answer these 
questions, an individual with developmental amnesia was tested on two temporal self-appraisal 
tasks: providing self-ratings of the Big Five personality traits and self-ratings social competence 
associated with past, present, and future time periods. Given a well-established life-long deficit 
in episodic memory, we speculate that any preserved form of self-knowledge in H.C. was 
acquired and maintained by relying on her semantic memories.   
 In Experiment 1, we compared case H.C. with a small group of age- and education -
matched controls on two temporal self-appraisal tasks. In Experiment 2, we compared case 
H.C.’s performance to that of a separate, larger group of controls (all female), some of whom 
were matched to H.C. on the level of self-esteem, as this has been shown to influence temporal 
self-appraisal (Ross & Wilson, 2002). The larger control group allowed for an additional 
examination of the relationship between episodic memory and past self-appraisal, and between 
future imagining and future self-appraisal. Case H.C. was tested separately for each experiment. 
The test sessions were spaced six months apart to further ensure the reliability of findings in a 
single case.    
Experiment 1 
Method 
Participants. H.C. is a 30-year-old woman with developmental amnesia. She was born 
prematurely and believed to have suffered respiratory distress soon after birth. She completed 
high school, 2 years of college (i.e., 14 years of education), and has successfully held several 
jobs. Whereas H.C.’s total brain volume (1270.83 cm2) is not appreciably different from that of 
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controls, neuroimaging results showed that she has a reduced hippocampal volume of 29.5% on 
the left and 31.2% on the right (Olsen et al., 2013). Detailed analysis of H.C.’s MTL and 
surrounding structures showed a complete absence of the mammillary bodies and the bilateral 
thinning of the anterior fornix, along with malrotated hippocampi, suggestive of a congenital 
origin to her atypically developed hippocampal memory system (Rosenbaum et al., 2014). 
Similar to other cases of developmental amnesia, H.C. has impaired episodic memory and 
relatively intact semantic memory (Rosenbaum et al., 2011; but see Blumenthal et al., 2017). Her 
memory retrieval has been shown to benefit from repetition when the items are spaced instead of 
being presented in immediate succession (Green et al., 2014; Kim, Saberi, Wiseheart, & 
Rosenbaum, 2018). H.C. showed impaired memory for public events (Rosenbaum et al., 2011), 
imagining close others’ experiences (Rabin et al., 2013), and working memory for previously 
unfamiliar words (Rose et al., 2012). In contrast, her working memory for famous faces and 
familiar words was found to be intact (Rose et al., 2012), as was her theory of mind (Rabin et al., 
2013), ability to imagine unfamiliar people’s experiences (Rabin et al., 2013), and future-
oriented decision-making on tests of intertemporal choice (Kwan et al., 2013).  
Although it appears that ratings of self-concept are intact in individuals with 
developmental amnesia, there is cursory evidence to suggest that H.C.’s self-description in the 
present may be impaired (unpublished data). When asked to describe herself in a paragraph, H.C. 
provided a relatively impoverished description of herself, mentioning only general characteristics 
(e.g., friendly, loyal) without providing any contextual information. In the current study, we 
wanted to formally investigate H.C.’s self-knowledge in the present, as well as to her self-
appraisal in the past and in the future.      
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A group of 24 (18 female) age-matched (M = 28.30, SD = 2.79) controls with no known 
history of neurological or psychiatric illness was recruited for the study from the participant 
pools at the Rotman Research Institute and York University. The control group had on average 
16.48 years of education (SD = 2.27). Participants signed informed consent forms and either 
received course credit or monetary compensation for participating in the study in accordance 
with the ethics boards of Baycrest Health Sciences and York University.   
Measures and procedure. Testing was conducted in the laboratory, using paper-and-
pencil versions of the questionnaires. Participants completed the questionnaires in the order 
presented below.    
The end of history illusion. Participants were asked to rate their personality on the Ten 
Item Personality Inventory (TIPI; Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 2003), a 10-item measure of the 
Big Five personality traits (i.e., conscientiousness, agreeableness, emotional stability, openness 
to experience, and extraversion). Participants were asked to rate how strongly they agree or 
disagree with each statement on a 7-point scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). 
Similar to the procedures described in Quadibach et al. (2013), participants were asked to 
complete the measure three times, rating their personality in the present, 5 years ago, and 5 years 
from now. The order of time periods was randomized for all participants. We calculated the total 
of absolute values of change for all of the Big Five traits in the past five years (i.e., the absolute 
difference between ratings in the present and five years ago), as well as in the next five years 
(i.e., the absolute difference between ratings in the present and five years from now).   
 Temporal self-appraisal. Participants were asked to rate their social competence during 
two past life periods: elementary school and high school (Ross & Wilson, 2002). For each time 
period, participants were asked to rate themselves on 11 attributes (e.g., popular, lonely) on a 
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semantic differential scale from 1 (unpopular) to 7 (popular). Participants were then asked to rate 
the pleasantness of their social experiences during that time period on a scale from -5 (very 
unpleasant) to +5 (very pleasant). Participants indicated the subjective distance of their current 
self from their past self by placing marks on two 190-mm lines. The responses on the first line 
range from 0 (feel very close to my past self) to 190 (feel very distant from my past self). The 
responses on the second line range from 0 (my past self feels very near) to 190 (my past self 
feels far away). Lastly, participants were asked to report how long ago it has really been since 
the last year of elementary school and high school. Participants then rated themselves on the 
same attributes in the present as well as how they imagined they would rate themselves on these 
attributes 5 years from now and 10 years from now.      
Results 
 The composite variables of the Big Five (i.e., emotional stability, extraversion, openness, 
agreeableness, and conscientiousness) 1 were constructed for the past, present, and future time 
periods. The absolute differences in each trait between past and present, and between present and 
future were summed together to obtain the reported change in the past five years and predicted 
change in the next five year. The control group reported having changed more in the past five 
years (M = 13.54, SD = 6.39) than predicting to change in the next five years (M = 9.54, SD = 
2.92), t(23) = 3.01, p = .006, 95% CI [1.25, 6.75]. Case H.C. showed a similar pattern of results 
                                               
1 TIPI has been shown to have somewhat inferior Cronbach’s alpha relative to larger measures of the Big Five. It 
has been pointed out that alphas may be not be an informative measure of internal consistency in scales with small 
number of items (Kline, 2000; Wood & Hampton, 2005). TIPI has shown adequate levels of: 1) convergence with 
widely used Big-Five measures in self, observer, and peer reports; 2) test-retest reliability; 3) patterns of predicted 
external correlates; and 4) convergence between self and observer ratings (Gosling et al., 2003). 
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(see Figure 1), reporting having changed more in the past five years (absolute difference in 
scores = 17) than she is predicting to change in the next five years (absolute difference in scores 
= 4). Crawford’s t-test for single case studies (Crawford & Howell, 1998) showed no significant 
differences between the absolute values of change in the past five years and the next five years 
between controls and H.C., t(23) = 1.35, p = .189.  
  The scale of social competence showed high internal consistency for all time periods: 
elementary school (α = .91), high school (α = .91), present (α = .85), 5 years from now (α = .85), 
and 10 years from now (α = .85). Repeated measures ANOVA indicated significant differences 
in self-appraisal in the control group across the time periods, F(4, 96) = 5.55, p < .001. Post hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean self-appraisal in elementary 
school (M = 4.45, SD = 1.34) is significantly lower than in the present (M = 5.06, SD = 0.95), p = 
.048, five years from now (M = 5.36, SD = 0.82), p < .001, and 10 years from now (M = 5.28, SD 
= 0.91), p = .002. No differences in self-appraisal were observed between other time periods in 
the control group. H.C. showed a different pattern of results (see Figure 2); specifically her 
change in self-appraisal from high school to present was significantly different from that of 
controls, t(23) = 2.37, p = .027. Results of judgment of temporal distance are presented in Table 
1. No significant differences were found between H.C. and the control group.  
Experiment 2 
Experiment 1 revealed no significant differences between H.C. and controls on the end of 
history illusion task, suggesting that past and future self-appraisal of personality does not require 
one to construct past or future episodes of oneself in context. The measure of social competence 
did not show the expected results in the group of control participants, such that participants did 
not evaluate themselves more positively in the present than in the final year of high school. 
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Previous research indicates that self-esteem is one of the moderators of temporal self-appraisal 
(Ross & Wilson, 2002). The purpose of Experiment 2 was to replicate the findings of 
Experiment 1 in a larger control group to obtain a subset of controls who match H.C.’s level of 
self-esteem, and to assess whether episodic memory and future imagining predict temporal self-
appraisal biases in the sample of controls. Doing so also allowed us to establish consistency in 
H.C.’s responses by examining test-retest correlations.     
Method 
Participants. The sample size was determined a priori by conducting a power analysis in 
G*Power (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) with two groups, five measurements, α = 
.05, a medium ES ƒ = .25, and 80% power, N = 78. We oversampled and recruited 102 
participants in order to be able to eliminate random responders, as well as to have a large enough 
subset of participants with the same level of self-esteem as case H.C. Two participants were 
removed from the analysis based on the conscientious responder scale (Marjanovic, Struthers, 
Cribbie, & Greenglass, 2014). The total sample of controls used for the analysis was composed 
of 100 (98 female) age-matched (M = 31.68, SD = 2.96) participants with no known history of 
neurological or psychiatric illness, recruited online via Prolific (www.prolific.ac). The control 
group had on average 16.24 years of education (SD = 2.78).  
Measures. All of the measures used in Experiment 1 were used in Experiment 2. We also 
included questionnaires to assess ratings of episodic memory, future imagining, and related 
abilities, and self-esteem.  
The Survey of Autobiographical Memory (SAM), a 26-item self-report inventory, was 
used to assess participants’ naturalistic autobiographical memory (Palombo, Williams, Abdi, & 
Levine, 2013). The SAM is composed of four subscales: episodic memory (e.g., When I 
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remember events, I have a hard time determining the order of details of the event.), semantic 
memory (e.g., I can easily remember names of famous people.), spatial memory (e.g., After I 
have visited an area, it is easy for me to find my way around the second time I visit.), and future 
imagining (e.g., When I imagine an event in the future, the event generates vivid mental images 
that are specific in time and place.). Participants rated their agreement with each statement on a 
scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree).   
Participants’ self-esteem was assessed with the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (RSES), a 
10-item scale (e.g., I certainly feel useless at times) measuring both positive and negative 
feelings about the self (Rosenberg, 1965). All items were answered on a 4-point scale, with 
responses ranging from 0 (strongly disagree) to 3 (strongly agree). Five items were reverse 
scored.  
We used the 5-item Conscientious Responder Scale (e.g., To answer this question, please 
choose option three, "neither agree nor disagree"; Marjanovic et al., 2014) to identify random 
responders.     
Procedure. Participants accessed the study online via Qualtrics. After signing the 
informed consent form and agreeing to participate in the study, participants completed the 
questionnaires in the following order: RSES, TIPI, SAM, and the social competence 
questionnaire. The order of presentation of past, present, and future time periods for the TIPI and 
social competence questionnaire was randomized. The items of the Conscientious Responder 
Scale were randomly distributed throughout the survey. H.C. also took the survey online six 
months after she participated in the paper-and-pencil version of the task in Experiment 1. 
Participants received monetary compensation for participating in the study in accordance with 
the ethics boards of Baycrest Health Sciences and York University.  
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Results 
 First, we analyzed the results of the TIPI. Absolute values of difference between the 
present and the past five years, and between the present and the next five years were calculated 
by adding together absolute differences in ratings for each trait (e.g., agreeableness) between past 
and present, and future and present respectively. The control group, on average, reported having 
changed more in the past five years (M = 9.36, SD = 5.49) than expecting to change in the next 
five years (M = 7.60, SD = 4.51), t(99) = 3.21, p < .001, 95% CI [0.67, 2.85]. Regression analysis 
showed that the order of presentation of time periods (i.e., past, present, and future) had no effect 
on the results, F(5,94) = 2.18, p = .062, R2 = 0.10. H.C.’s results strongly correlated with her 
responses 6 months ago (reported in Experiment 1), r = .81, p < .001. Similar to controls, H.C. 
reported having changed more in the past five years (absolute difference = 14) than expecting to 
change in the next five years (absolute difference = 4). Crawford’s t-test showed no differences 
between H.C. and the control group, t(99) = 1.49, p = .138. We then ran analysis to determine 
whether episodic memory predicted the reported change in personality in the past five years, and 
whether future imagining predicted the expected change in the next five years in the control 
sample. Both, episodic memory and future imagining subscales of the SAM, showed high 
internal consistency, α = .86 and α = .81 respectively. In the control group, episodic memory did 
not predict the difference between the ratings of self in the past and the present, 𝛽'  = -0.07, SE = 
0.04, p = .068. Similarly, future imagining scores did not predict the difference between the 
ratings of self in the future and the present, 𝛽'  = -0.002, SE = 0.04, p = .961.     
 Analysis of the social competence scale showed high internal consistency for each time 
period in the control group: elementary school (α = .94), high school (α = .96), the present (α = 
.89), 5 years from now (α = .90), and 10 years from now (α = .90). The order of presentation of 
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the time periods had no significant effect on the pattern of self-appraisal, 𝜒)(20) = 17.32, p = 
.632. RSES showed high internal consistency (α = .89). We used R package lme4 (Bates, 
Maechler & Bolker, 2012) to perform a linear mixed effects analysis to test whether the 
relationship between participants’ ratings of social competence across time periods is moderated 
by the participants’ self-esteem (see Table 2). Time period, self-esteem, and their interaction 
were entered as fixed effects in the model. We included subject as random intercept in the model. 
A likelihood ratio test comparing the full model with the interaction term against the null model 
without the interaction showed that self-appraisal across different time periods is moderated by 
self-esteem, 𝜒)(4) = 9.82, p = .044. Analysis of simple slopes showed that individuals with 
higher self-esteem tended to appraise themselves more positively in the present, 𝛽'  = 0.10, SE = 
0.02, t(242.68) = 4.35, p < .001. Individuals with higher self-esteem also tended to appraise 
themselves more positively in high school, 𝛽'  = 0.05, SE = 0.02, t(242.68) = 2.08, p = .038, but 
not in elementary school, 𝛽'  = 0.04, SE = 0.02, t(242.68) = 1.57, p = .117. Each additional unit of 
self-esteem was also associated with significantly more positive self-appraisal 5 years from now, 𝛽'  = 0.08, SE = 0.02, t(242.68) = 3.41, p < .001, and 10 years from now, 𝛽'  = 0.06, SE = 0.02, 
t(242.68) = 2.61, p = .009. The results of the regression model suggest that it is necessary to 
control for the level of self-esteem in comparing temporal self-appraisal between H.C. and 
controls. H.C. scored high on the measure of self-esteem (28 out of 30). She previously also 
scored high (29 out of 30) on this measure about 6 months ago, suggesting high test-retest 
reliability. Controls ranged on the self-esteem scores from 5 to 29 (M = 19.06, SD = 4.91). We 
selected a subset of individuals with high self-esteem by including those with self-esteem scores 
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higher or equal to 212. The high self-esteem subset was composed of 36 participants with an 
average age of 32.08 (SD = 3.09), an average education of 16.36 years (SD = 2.52), and an 
average self-esteem rating of 23.86 (SD = 2.52). Regression analysis showed that in the high 
self-esteem group, participants tended to rate themselves more negatively in elementary school, 𝛽'  = -0.32, SE = 0.16, t(140) = -1.99, p = .048, and in high school, 𝛽'  = -0.38, SE = 0.16, t(140) = 
-2.32, p = .022, than in the present. The self-ratings between the present and five years from 
now, and between the present and 10 years from now did not show significant differences, t(140) 
= 1.39, p = .168 and t(140) = 1.69, p = .093. Crawford’s t-test showed no significant differences 
in the changes in self-appraisal from high school to present between H.C. and controls, t(35) = 
1.53, p = .134. H.C.’s results strongly correlated with her responses on this task 6 months ago 
(reported in Experiment 1), r = .97, p < .001.  
Based on SAM, controls reported that, on average, they are better at remembering the 
past (M = 132.93, SD = 57.95) than imagining the future (M = 126.45, SD = 48.47), t(99) = 4.96, 
p < .001, 95% CI [4.54, 10.59]. On the other hand, H.C. reported being better at imagining the 
future (94.32) than remembering the past (80.27). Lastly, we ran a regression analysis to estimate 
whether episodic memory and future imagining moderated the relationship between time periods 
and self-appraisal in controls. A 1-unit increase in episodic memory score was associated with 𝛽'  
= 0.02 increase in self-appraisal in the present, SE = 0.01, t(85) = 3.54, p < .001. However, 
episodic memory did not moderate the relationship between time and self-appraisal, 𝜒)(4) = 
4.75, p = .314. The future imagining subscale of the SAM did not moderate the relationship 
                                               
2 The self-esteem scores were approximately normally distributed, with the mean of 19.06 (SD = 4.91) and the 
median of 20.   
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between time and self-appraisal, 𝜒)(4) = 3.73, p = .445. Controlling for objective distance, 
participants felt significantly closer to their future selves 10 years from now than back in high 
school, which was on average 14.47 years ago (SD = 3.81), 𝛽'  = -22.39, SE = 7.49, t(197) = -
2.99, p = .003. H.C.’s ratings of subjective temporal distance were not significantly different 
from that of controls for high school, t(35) = 0.54, p = .593, and for 10 years from now, t(35) = -
1.76, p = .09.  
Discussion 
 To determine contributions of episodic memory to biases in temporal self-appraisal, a 
person with impaired episodic memory was compared to controls in two experiments that used 
different measures (personality and social competence), samples (student and non-student), and 
contexts (laboratory, online). The second experiment also investigated whether episodic memory 
and future imagining could statistically explain the variability in temporal self-appraisal in the 
control group. We found that controls and H.C. showed typical self-appraisal biases when 
thinking about their past and future selves, such that they reported having changed more in the 
past five years than they expected to change in the next five years and rating themselves more 
positively in the present than in the past time periods. These biases were present despite impaired 
episodic memory in H.C., and they were not predicted by ratings of episodic memory or future 
imagining ability in controls. The results indicate that episodic memory and future imagining are 
unlikely to form the basis of the end of history illusion and time-based biases in social 
competence. The findings also contribute to cognitive explanations of the temporal self-appraisal 
theory in particular, and the theoretical link between autobiographical memory and self-identity 
more generally. 
Possible Explanations of Temporal Self-Appraisal 
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It has been previously suggested that the biases in temporal self-appraisal could be 
explained by a relative difficulty of imagining the future compared to remembering the past 
(Quoidbach et al., 2013), memory bias (Cameron et al., 2004; Conway & Ross, 1984), and 
subjective temporal distance (Ross & Wilson, 2002). The current research explored these 
previously offered explanations for the temporal self-appraisal biases.  
Previous research suggests that the end of history illusion could be explained by a relative 
difficulty in imagining the future compared to remembering the past (Quoidbach et al., 2013). 
However, in Experiment 2, future imagining scores did not predict controls’ differences between 
the present and the future self-appraisal and episodic memory did not predict the difference 
between the past and the present self-appraisal. Similarly, H.C. has established difficulties 
remembering details of past events in episodic memory, whereas her future imagining is at least 
better than her episodic memory (Kwan et al., 2010) and possibly intact (Hurley et al., 2011), 
reflected in her current self-ratings of better future imagining ability than episodic memory. Yet, 
she, too, showed typical biases in thinking about the self from the past to present vs. present to 
future. If the reduced anticipated change in the future could be explained by one’s difficulties in 
imagining the future, we would expect H.C. to show the opposite of the end of history illusion 
(i.e., reporting having changed less in the past five years than expecting to change in the next 
five years). These findings rule out the possibility that the end of history illusion is explained by 
greater difficulty imagining the future than remembering the past.   
It has been previously proposed that an “illusion of change” in self-appraisal from the 
past to the present might be explained by a memory bias in people’s reconstructions of past 
selves (Conway & Ross, 1984). In line with this idea, a presentism hypothesis suggests that 
people tend to reconstruct and interpret their past on the basis of their present knowledge and 
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motives (Cameron et al., 2004). The findings from the current research suggest that temporal 
self-appraisal does not require one to “reconstruct” the past self. Although individuals with 
episodic amnesia may retain their narrative construction abilities, provided that the relevant 
details of the story are available to them (Keven, Kurczek, Rosenbaum, & Craver, 2018, but see 
Race et al., 2011, 2015), their deficits in constructing past and future personal episodes are well-
established (Hassabis et al., 2007; Schacter & Addis, 2007, Schacter et al., 2007). It is possible 
that H.C. was using the details from her life in the present as a prototype to construct a slightly 
more negative version of herself in the past. However, we view this explanation as unlikely 
because H.C.’s self-appraisal scores relating to the past time periods only weakly to moderately 
correlated with her self-appraisal in the present, yet, her self-appraisal in the past was strongly 
correlated between the two testing sessions that took place six months apart from each other. 
According to temporal self-appraisal theory, temporal self-appraisal could be explained 
by one’s subjective judgments of temporal distance (i.e., ratings of how far one feels from his or 
her past and future; Cameron et al., 2004; Ross & Wilson, 2002). In the current research, we did 
not find a significant relationship between subjective judgments of temporal distance and 
temporal self-appraisal. It is possible that given the moderating relationship with self-esteem, our 
high self-esteem subset was not large enough to detect the relationship. It was also found that 
H.C. was not different from controls in her subjective judgments of distance. This finding is 
consistent with the temporal self-appraisal theory because H.C. also showed an intact temporal 
self-appraisal bias. However, the finding contradicts the argument for memory bias proposed by 
the temporal self-appraisal theory (Cameron et al., 2004). If subjective judgment of temporal 
distance and temporal self-appraisal were supported by the episodic memory system, we would 
expect H.C.’s judgments to be systematically different from that of controls.          
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An alternative possibility is that H.C.’s self-ratings are inconsistent in light of her deficit 
in episodic memory. Given that H.C. does not rely on specific memories when providing self-
ratings, we had to consider the possibility that her ratings are less stable over time and perhaps 
depend on her state when making those ratings. H.C. was tested on both tasks on two separate 
occasions spaced 6 months apart, and her ratings nevertheless were found to be highly correlated 
with each other. The results suggest that H.C. has a consistent sense of self and a stable idea of 
what she is like as a person. This finding contradicts the assumptions of the SMS model 
(Conway et al., 2004) that the episodic memory system and one’s self-knowledge need to work 
together to maintain a stable and coherent view of self. 
The Role of Self-Esteem in Temporal Self-Appraisal 
 In line with previous temporal self-appraisal finding (Ross & Wilson, 2003), controls 
rated themselves more negatively on the social competence scale in the past (i.e., elementary 
school and high school) relative to their self-ratings in the present. We also found that self-
esteem moderated the pattern of temporal self-appraisal in the control group, further supporting 
the temporal self-appraisal theory. Moreover, we found that H.C.’s temporal self-appraisal 
pattern did not differ from that of a subset of controls who were matched to H.C. in terms of 
level of self-esteem. Although not significantly different from controls, H.C.’s greater difference 
in self-appraisal between high school and present could be explained by her very high self-
esteem score. It is possible that in order to protect her high self-esteem in the present, H.C. may 
need to feel greater improvement in her social competence over time. Furthermore, in 
Experiment 2, episodic memory and future imagining did not predict the pattern of temporal self-
appraisal in the control group. The findings suggest that temporal self-appraisal does not require 
one to conjure up specific memories or images of self in order to evaluate oneself in the present, 
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past, or future. The current results are consistent with the findings of other studies showing intact 
self-knowledge in individuals with MTL lesions (e.g., Klein et al., 2002; Picard et al., 2013; 
Tulving, 1993). The findings extend previous research by showing that individuals with MTL 
lesions not only are able to describe themselves in the present, but also retain their abilities think 
about their personality traits in the past and the future. Whereas previous research showed that 
individuals with acquired amnesia (Klein et al., 2002, Tulving, 1993) and developmental 
amnesia (Picard et al., 2013) may develop reasonably accurate self-knowledge in the present, our 
results suggest that they may also retain the ability to think about their personality and social 
competence in the past and in the future. Unlike individuals with acquired amnesia, who may 
rely on their episodic memory pre-injury, individuals with developmental amnesia never 
experienced normal episodic memory. Therefore, the findings in H.C. provide a strong basis for 
the argument of the lack of engagement of episodic memory in temporal self-appraisal.     
Neural Underpinnings of Time-Based Judgments of Self       
 The findings suggest that one’s temporal self-appraisal does not rely on the function of 
the MTL, but instead could be supported by other brain regions. A possible candidate is 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC). In a study of a group of individuals with a range of 
neurodegenerative conditions, present self-appraisal accuracy was correlated with the tissue 
content in the right vmPFC (Rosen et al., 2010). Several other studies investigated the role of 
vmPFC in self-appraisal (D’Argembeau, 2013; Kim & Johnson, 2015; Verfaellie, Wank, Reid, 
Race, & Keane, 2019). There is general agreement in the findings, such that vmPFC does not 
support self-reflection per se, but, rather, is involved in attributing personal value or personal 
significance to the processed information (D’Argembeau, 2013; Kim & Johnson, 2015). In a 
recent study investigating distinct contributions of vmPFC and MTL to self-related processing, 
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individuals with vmPFC lesions did not show differences in constructing future scenarios 
involving self or another person (Verfaellie et al., 2019). On the other hand, individuals with 
MTL lesions performed relatively better in the self condition than in another person condition 
(Verfaellie et al., 2019). The findings show the important role of vmPFC in the processing of 
self-relevant information. Furthermore, previous research shows that vmPFC has two schema-
dependent functions: establishing context-relevant templates and mediating decision monitoring 
processes to ensure that only responses compatible with the template are enacted (Gilboa & 
Moscovitch, 2017). In line with this theory, studies of vmPFC patients found a reduced influence 
of schematic memory on recognition relative to neurotypical controls (Ghosh, Moscovitch, 
Colella, Gilboa, 2014; Spalding, Jones, Duff, Tranel, & Warren, 2015).  Therefore, it is possible 
that H.C.’s temporal self-appraisal is supported by her relatively intact self-schema that reflects 
abstracted commonalities in self across multiple experiences during different life periods (e.g., 
feeling constantly rejected by peers in high school).    
Different Types of Self-Knowledge 
The results suggest the importance of distinguishing between different types of self-
knowledge. Whereas H.C.’s temporal sense of personality and what she is like socially appear to 
be consistent and intact, there may be aspects of self-appraisal that are impaired due to her lack 
of rich episodic memories. For example, when H.C. was asked to describe herself in her own 
words, the description was very impoverished. Although her ratings of self are consistent, it 
seems difficult for her to contextualize her traits and characteristics. When neurotypical adults 
were asked to describe themselves, even in very concise descriptions of self, participants tended 
to contextualize their traits (e.g., “introverted, especially in new situations”, “I like quiet time, 
especially in natural environments”, “I enjoy arts, particularly visual arts”). This type of 
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contextual information likely relies on participants’ ability to recall specific events in which they 
were personally involved in the past and remember how they demonstrated their traits in those 
situations. This observation is consistent with work showing that individuals with MTL lesions 
experience deficits in generating episodic-near autobiographical facts that could provide 
spatiotemporal context to their narratives (Grilli & Verfaellie, 2016). It also supports the 
proposition made by the Pebble et al. (2013) model that abstract conceptual self-knowledge does 
not rely on the episodic memory system, but that episodic memory may enhance a more nuanced 
self-understanding by providing the necessary detail. The two self-appraisal tasks used here 
involved a different degree of abstraction. The Big Five personality questionnaire required 
participants to think about themselves more abstractly without necessarily having to recall 
specific examples of when they exhibited personality traits from episodic memory. The social 
competence questionnaire required participants to rate themselves in more specific social 
contexts (i.e., elementary school, high school) in the past, but again, this task did not require 
participants to retrieve memories from a specific time and place in order to generate the self-
ratings. Whereas the self-competence task was more contextualized than the personality 
appraisal task, neither task required participants to generate concrete details of their personality.    
Forms of Future Thinking 
 There is currently no agreement with regard to H.C.’s ability to imagine the future. If it is 
the case that H.C.’s future imagining is somewhat compromised, there are other forms of future 
thinking that remain intact, such as intertemporal choice (i.e., future-oriented decision-making). 
One way of investigating episodic memory contributions to other forms of future-oriented 
thinking would be to assess her performance on tests of temporal construal (i.e., the extent to 
which people’s thinking is abstract or concrete; Liberman & Trope, 1998). The judgments of 
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temporal distance have also been shown to play an important role in temporal construal, with 
temporally near events represented in a concrete way (e.g., thinking of locking the door as 
putting a key in the lock) and temporally distant events represented in a more abstract way (e.g., 
locking the door as a means of securing the house; Liberman & Trope, 1998). Considering that 
no differences in the judgments of subjective temporal distance were found between H.C. and 
controls, it is reasonable to expect that episodic memory does not support temporal construal.  
Conclusion 
 In two experiments, it was found that biases in one’s temporal self-knowledge are not 
supported by one’s episodic memory and future imagining. This research replicated previous 
research on temporal self-appraisal, showing that people tend to disparage their past selves in 
order to maintain positive self-esteem in the present. The end of history illusion was also 
replicated in this research, showing that individuals tend to report having changed more in a 
certain amount of time in the past than they anticipate changing in the same amount of time in 
the future. No significant relationship was found between subjective judgments of temporal 
distance and temporal self-appraisal. However, both H.C. and controls reported feeling closer to 
their future selves than to their past selves, which could potentially explain the end of history 
illusion. The findings suggest that temporal self-appraisal is not supported by one’s episodic 
memory but, instead, might be supported by a personal schema that emerges from multiple 
experiences over time. 
  
 
 
 
 28 
References 
Addis, D. R., & Tippett, L. J. (2004). Memory of myself: Autobiographical memory and identity 
in Alzheimer's disease. Memory, 12(1), 56-74. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658210244000423 
Addis, D. R., & Schacter, D. L. (2013). Future-oriented simulations: The role of episodic 
memory. Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition, 2(4), 248-250. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jarmac.2013.10.003  
Addis, D. R., Wong, A. T., & Schacter, D. L. (2007). Remembering the past and imagining the 
future: Common and distinct neural substrates during event construction and 
elaboration. Neuropsychologia, 45(7), 1363-1377. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016 
Andelman F., Hoofien D., Goldberg I., Aizenstein O., & Neufeld M.Y. (2010). Bilateral 
hippocampal lesion and a selective impairment of the ability for mental time travel. 
Neurocase, 6, 426–435. 
Bates, D., Maechler, M., & Bolker, B. (2012). lme4: Linear mixed-effects models using S4 
classes (R Package). Doi: http://cran.r-project.org/web/packages/lme4/index.html 
Blumenthal, A., Duke, D., Bowles, B., Gilboa, A., Rosenbaum, R. S., Köhler, S., & McRae, K. 
(2017). Abnormal semantic knowledge in a case of developmental 
amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 102, 237-247. 
Buckner, R. L., & Carroll, D. C. (2007). Self-projection and the brain. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 11(2), 49-57. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2006.11.004 
Cameron, J. J., Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2004). Autobiographical memory and self-
assessment. In D. R. Beike, J. M. Lampinen & D. A. Behrend (Eds.), The self and 
 29 
memory; the self and memory (pp. 207-226, Chapter x, 268 Pages) Psychology Press, 
New York, NY. 
Carson, N., Murphy, K. J., Moscovitch, M., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2016). Older adults show a 
self-reference effect for narrative information. Memory, 24(9), 1157-1172. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09658211.2015.1080277 
Conway, M., & Ross, M. (1984). Getting what you want by revising what you had.Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 47(4), 738-748. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-
3514.47.4.738 
Conway, M. A., Singer, J. A., & Tagini, A. (2004). The self and autobiographical memory: 
Correspondence and coherence. Social Cognition, 22(5), 491-529. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.22.5.491.50768 
Cooper, J. M., Vargha-Khadem, F., Gadian, D. G., & Maguire, E. A. (2011). The effect of 
hippocampal damage in children on recalling the past and imagining new 
experiences. Neuropsychologia, 49(7), 1843-1850. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.03.008 
Crawford, J. R., & Howell, D. C. (1998). Comparing an individual's test score against norms 
derived from small samples. Clinical Neuropsychologist, 12(4), 482-486. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1076/clin.12.4.482.7241 
D'Argembeau, A. (2013). On the role of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex in self-processing: 
The valuation hypothesis. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 7, 13. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.3389/fnhum.2013.00372 
D'Argembeau, A., Feyers, D., Majerus, S., Collette, F., Van der Linden, M., Maquet, P., & 
Salmon, E. (2008). Self-reflection across time: Cortical midline structures differentiate 
 30 
between present and past selves. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 3(3), 244-
252. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsn020 
Faul, F., Erdfelder, E., Lang, A., & Buchner, A. (2007). G*Power 3: A flexible statistical power 
analysis program for the social, behavioral, and biomedical sciences. Behavior Research 
Methods, 39(2), 175-191. 
Feyers, D., Collette, F., D'Argembeau, A., Majerus, S., & Salmon, E. (2010). Neural networks 
involved in self-judgement in young and elderly adults.NeuroImage, 53(1), 341-347. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.05.071 
Ghosh, V. E., Moscovitch, M., Colella, B. M., & Gilboa, A. (2014). Schema representation in 
patients with ventromedial PFC lesions. The Journal of Neuroscience, 34(36), 12057-
12070. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.0740-14.2014 
Gilboa, A., & Moscovitch, M. (2017). Ventromedial prefrontal cortex generates pre-stimulus 
theta coherence desynchronization: A schema instantiation hypothesis. Cortex: A Journal 
Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior, 87, 16-30. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2016.10.008 
Gosling, S. D., Rentfrow, P. J., & Swann, W. B., Jr. (2003). A very brief measure of the Big Five 
personality domains. Journal of Research in Personality, 37, 504-528 
Green, J. L., Weston, T., Wiseheart, M., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2014). Long-term spacing effect 
benefits in developmental amnesia: Case experiments in rehabilitation. Neuropsychology, 
28(5), 685-694. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/neu0000070 
Grilli, M. D., & Verfaellie, M. (2015). Supporting the self-concept with memory: Insight from 
amnesia. Social Cognitive and Affective Neuroscience, 10(12), 1684-1692. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsv056 
 31 
Grilli, M. D., & Verfaellie, M. (2016). Experience-near but not experience-far autobiographical 
facts depend on the medial temporal lobe for retrieval: Evidence from amnesia. 
Neuropsychologia, 81, 180-185. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2015.12.023 
Habermas, T., & Bluck, S. (2000). Getting a life: The emergence of the life story in adolescence. 
Psychological Bulletin. 126. 748-69. 10.1037/0033-2909.126.5.748. 
Hassabis, D., Kumaran, D., Vann, S. D., & Maguire, E. A. (2007). Patients with hippocampal 
amnesia cannot imagine new experiences. PNAS Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences of the United States of America, 104(5), 1726-1731. 
Hurley, N. C., Maguire, E. A., & Vargha-Khadem, F. (2011). Patient HC with developmental 
amnesia can construct future scenarios. Neuropsychologia, 49(13), 3620-3628. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.09.015 
Keven, N., Kurczek, J., Rosenbaum, R. S., & Craver, C. F. (2018). Narrative construction is 
intact in episodic amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 110, 104-112. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.07.028 
Kim, A. S. N., Saberi, F. M., Wiseheart, M., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2018). Ameliorating episodic 
memory deficits in a young adult with developmental (congenital) amnesia. Journal of 
the International Neuropsychological Society. 24. 1003-1012. 
10.1017/S1355617718000589. 
Kim, K., & Johnson, M. K. (2015). Activity in ventromedial prefrontal cortex during self-related 
processing: Positive subjective value or personal significance? Social Cognitive and 
Affective Neuroscience, 10(4), 494-500. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/scan/nsu078 
 32 
Kirwan, C. B., Ashby, S. R., & Nash, M. I. (2014). Remembering and imagining differentially 
engage the hippocampus: A multivariate fMRI investigation. Cognitive Neuroscience, 
5(3-4), 177-185. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17588928.2014.933203 
Klein, S. B., Cosmides, L., & Costabile, K. A. (2003). Preserved knowledge of self in a case of 
Alzheimer's dementia. Social Cognition, 21(2), 157-165. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.21.2.157.21317 
Klein, S. B., Cosmides, L., Costabile, K. A., & Mei, L. (2002). Is there something special about 
the self? A neuropsychological case study. Journal of Research in Personality, 36(5), 
490-506. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0092-6566(02)00001-6 
Klein, S. B., Loftus, J., & Kihlstrom, J. F. (2002). Memory and temporal experience: The effects 
of episodic memory loss on an amnesic patient's ability to remember the past and imagine 
the future. Social Cognition, 20(5), 353-379. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.20.5.353.21125 
Klein, S. B., Rozendal, K., & Cosmides, L. (2002). A social-cognitive neuroscience analysis of 
the self. Social Cognition, 20(2), 105-135. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1521/soco.20.2.105.20991 
Kraus, B., Robinson, R., White, J., Eichenbaum, H., & Hasselmo, M. (2013). Hippocampal “time 
cells”: Time versus path integration. Neuron, 78(6), 1090-1101. 
doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2013.04.015 
Kwan, D., Carson, N., Addis, D. R., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2010). Deficits in past remembering 
extend to future imagining in a case of developmental amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 
48(11), 3179-3186. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2010.06.011 
 33 
Kwan, D., Craver, C. F., Green, L., Myerson, J., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2013). Dissociations in 
future thinking following hippocampal damage: Evidence from discounting and time 
perspective in episodic amnesia. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 142(4), 
1355-1369. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0034001 
Lachowicz-Tabaczek, K., & Bajcar, B. (2017). Future self-appraisals and global self-esteem: 
Who benefits more from thinking about the future, and why? Self and Identity, 16(4), 
460-479. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15298868.2016.1270850 
Levine, B., Svoboda, E., Hay, J. F., Winocur, G., & Moscovitch, M. (2002). Aging and 
autobiographical memory: Dissociating episodic from semantic retrieval. Psychology and 
Aging, 17(4), 677-689. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0882-7974.17.4.677 
MacDonald, C.J., Lepage, K.Q., Eden, U.T. and Eichenbaum, H. (2011) Hippocampal “Time 
Cells” bridge the gap in memory for discontiguous events. Neuron, 71, 737-749.  
doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuron.2011.07.012 
Marjanovic, Z., Holden, R., Struthers, W., Cribbie, R., & Greenglass, E. (2015). The inter-item 
standard deviation (ISD): An index that discriminates between conscientious and random 
responders. Personality and Individual Differences, 84, 79-83. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2014.08.021 
Markus, H., & Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. American Psychologist, 41(9), 954-969. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.41.9.954 
Nichelli, P., Venneri, A., Molinari, M., Tavani, F., & Grafman, J. (1993). Precision and accuracy 
of subjective time estimation in different memory disorders. Cognitive Brain Research, 
1(2), 87-93. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/0926-6410(93)90014-V 
 34 
Olsen, R. K., Palombo, D. J., Rabin, J. S., Levine, B., Ryan, J. D., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2013). 
Volumetric analysis of medial temporal lobe subregions in developmental amnesia using 
high-resolution magnetic resonance imagining. Hippocampus, 23(10), 855-860. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.22153 
Palombo, D. J., Keane, M. M., & Verfaellie, M. (2016). Does the hippocampus keep track of 
time? Hippocampus, 26(3), 372-379. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/hipo.22528 
Palombo, D. J., Williams, L. J., Abdi, H., & Levine, B. (2013). The survey of autobiographical 
memory (SAM): A novel measure of trait mnemonics in everyday life. Cortex: A Journal 
Devoted to the Study of the Nervous System and Behavior, 49(6), 1526-1540. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.08.023 
Picard, L., Mayor-Dubois, C., Maeder, P., Kalenzaga, S., Abram, M., Duval, C., . . . Piolino, P. 
(2013). Functional independence within the self-memory system: New insights from two 
cases of developmental amnesia. Cortex: A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous 
System and Behavior, 49(6), 1463-1481. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2012.10.003 
Prebble, S. C., Addis, D. R., & Tippett, L. J. (2013). Autobiographical memory and sense of 
self. Psychological Bulletin, 139(4), 815-840. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0030146 
Quoidbach, J., Gilbert, D. T., & Wilson, T. D. (2013). The end of history illusion. 
Science, 339(6115), 96-98. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1229294 
Rabin, J. S., Carson, N., Gilboa, A., Stuss, D. T., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2013). Imagining other 
people’s experiences in a person with impaired episodic memory: The role of personal 
familiarity. Frontiers in Psychology, 3, 10.  
 35 
Race, E., Keane, M. M., & Verfaellie, M. (2011). Medial temporal lobe damage causes deficits 
in episodic memory and episodic future thinking not attributable to deficits in narrative 
construction. The Journal of Neuroscience, 31(28), 10262-10269. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1145-11.2011 
Renoult, L., Davidson, P. S. R., Palombo, D. J., Moscovitch, M., & Levine, B. (2012). Personal 
semantics: At the crossroads of semantic and episodic memory. Trends in Cognitive 
Sciences, 16(11), 550-558. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tics.2012.09.003 
Rose, N. S., Olsen, R. K., Craik, F. I. M., & Rosenbaum, R. S. (2012). Working memory and 
amnesia: The role of stimulus novelty. Neuropsychologia, 50(1), 11-18. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2011.10.016 
Rosen, H. J., Alcantar, O., Rothlind, J., Sturm, V., Kramer, J. H., Weiner, M., & Miller, B. L. 
(2010). Neuroanatomical correlates of cognitive self-appraisal in neurodegenerative 
disease. NeuroImage, 49(4), 3358-3364. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2009.11.041 
Rosenbaum, R. S., Gao, F., Honjo, K., Raybaud, C., Olsen, R. K., Palombo, D. J., . . . Black, S. 
E. (2014). Congenital absence of the mammillary bodies: A novel finding in a well-
studied case of developmental amnesia. Neuropsychologia, 65, 82-87. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2014.09.047 
Rosenbaum, R.S., Carson, N., Abraham, N., Bowles, B., Kwan, D., Köhler, S., Svoboda, E., 
Richards, B., & Levine, B. (2011). Impaired event memory and recollection in a case of 
developmental amnesia. Neurocase, 17, 394–409. 
Rosenberg, M. (1965). Society and the adolescent self-image. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
 36 
Ross, M., & Wilson, A. E. (2002). It feels like yesterday: Self-esteem, valence of personal past 
experiences, and judgments of subjective distance. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 82(5), 792-803. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.82.5.792 
Schacter, D. L., & Addis, D. R. (2007). On the constructive episodic simulation of past and 
future events. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30(3), 331-332. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X07002178 
Spalding, K. N., Jones, S. H., Duff, M. C., Tranel, D., & Warren, D. E. (2015). Investigating the 
neural correlates of schemas: Ventromedial prefrontal cortex is necessary for normal 
schematic influence on memory. The Journal of Neuroscience, 35(47), 15746-15751. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1523/JNEUROSCI.2767-15.2015 
Spreng, R. N., Stevens, W. D., Chamberlain, J. P., Gilmore, A. W., & Schacter, D. L. (2010). 
Default network activity, coupled with the frontoparietal control network, supports goal-
directed cognition. NeuroImage, 53(1), 303-317. 
doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuroimage.2010.06.016 
Symons, C. S., & Johnson, B. T. (1997). The self-reference effect in memory: A meta-
analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 121(3), 371-394. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/0033-
2909.121.3.371 
Tanguay, A. N., Benton, L., Romio, L., Sievers, C., Davidson, P. S. R., & Renoult, L. (2018). 
The ERP correlates of self-knowledge: Are assessments of one’s past, present, and future 
traits closer to semantic or episodic memory? Neuropsychologia, 110, 65-83. doi: 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2017.10.024 
Tulving, E. (1972). Episodic and semantic memory. In E. Tulving & W. 
Donaldson, Organization of memory. Oxford, England: Academic Press. 
 37 
Tulving, E. (1993). In Srull T. K., Wyer R. S.,Jr. (Eds.). Self-knowledge of an amnesic individual 
is represented abstractly. Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc, Hillsdale, NJ. 
Verfaellie, M., Wank, A. A., Reid, A. G., Race, E., & Keane, M. M. (2019). Self-related 
processing and future thinking: Distinct contributions of ventromedial prefrontal cortex 
and the medial temporal lobes. Cortex: A Journal Devoted to the Study of the Nervous 
System and Behavior, 115, 159-171. doi:http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.cortex.2019.01.028 
Wilson, A. E., & Ross, M. (2003). The identity function of autobiographical memory: Time is on 
our side. Memory, 11(2), 137-149. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/741938210 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 38 
 
Figure 1. Reported and predicted personality change in controls and H.C. between the present 
and the past five years and the present and five years from now.  
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Figure 2. Social competence in H.C. and controls (Experiment 1) across five time periods 
(elementary school, high school, present, five years from now, and ten years from now), with 
higher scores reflecting a more positive self-appraisal.   
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Table 1. Results of the Crawford t-tests, comparing the judgments of subjective temporal 
distance between H.C. and controls across past and future time periods.  
 
 Controls H.C.   
Measure M SD  t(23) p 
Objective Temporal Distance 
Elementary School 
High School 
 
16.65  
10.91  
 
3.52  
3.19 
 
18 
12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Subjective Temporal Distance 
Elementary School 
High School 
Five Years from Now 
Ten Years from Now 
 
110.92  
105.12 
70.46 
94.5 
 
50.70 
48.73 
39.32 
45.60 
 
128  
148 
46 
50 
 
0.33 
0.86 
-0.61 
-0.96 
 
.744 
.398 
.548 
.349 
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Table 2. Model with Self-Appraisal Regressed on Time Period and Self-Esteem 
 
 Self-appraisal 
Fixed Effects  𝛽'  SE          t 
   Intercept    2.581     0.46    5.66*** 
   Elementary School 1.192 0.45    2.63** 
   High School 
   Five Years from Now 
   Ten Years from Now 
   Self-Esteem 
   Self-Esteem × Elementary School 
   Self-Esteem × High School 
   Self-Esteem × Five Years from Now 
   Self-Esteem × Ten Years from Now 
1.416 
0.779 
1.300 
0.101 
-0.064 
-0.052 
-0.022 
-0.040 
0.45 
0.45 
0.45 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
0.02 
   2.21* 
   1.72 
   2.87** 
   4.35*** 
   -2.79** 
   -2.28* 
   -0.95 
   -1.75    
Random Effects 𝛽'  SD  
   Participants  
     Intercept error variance 
 
0.646 
 
0.80 
 
     Residual 0.635 0.80  
Note. Present time period was used as the reference condition in the analysis.  
*p < .05, **p <.01, ***p <.001 
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Figure 3. Social competence in H.C. and controls (Experiment 2) across five time periods 
(elementary school, high school, present, five years from now, and 10 years from now), with 
higher scores reflecting more positive self-appraisal. The blue line indicates the mean pattern of 
results for the control group, with the grey shaded area around it reflecting standard errors.    
 
 
